Inequality, housing, demography

Two lines diverging: Poland falls from 30.8 to 24.9, the Union barely moves. In a decade Poland went from the EU average to the fifth-lowest level of income inequality in the Union. The richest 20% of Poles now have 3.6 times the income of the poorest 20% — against fivefold in 2010.

This is the strongest correction to the thesis set out in this document's brief: income inequality is not a dark side of contemporary Poland. The dark sides of inequality have other dimensions — the next charts show them.

The 2025 ranking places Poland among the most egalitarian societies on the continent — between Slovenia and the Netherlands, clearly ahead of Germany, France, Spain and Italy. The gender pay gap (next chart) and the poverty rate (chapter 5) complete the picture: three independent measures, one image.

Poland has the fourth-lowest pay gap in the EU — nearly three times below the EU average and four times below Germany's. Partly it is structural: a highly feminised public sector and women's higher education (the gender gap in tertiary degrees — 17.9 pp in women's favour — is among the largest in the EU).

Political representation lags: a record 29.6% of women in the Sejm is still below the EU average, with 44% of women on the lists — women were systematically placed lower down.

The sharpest inequality in contemporary Poland is not income but geography. The Warsaw region is statistically richer than Berlin and Vienna, while six eastern and northern regions do not exceed 62% of the EU average. The spread between the richest and poorest region is almost threefold.

An important caveat: every region grew and none stood still — Lublin and Subcarpathia gained 6–7 points each since 2015. The distance to Warsaw is not shrinking, but the distance to the Union is — in every voivodeship.

The most vivid dark side of living standards after demography: almost one in three Poles lives in overcrowded conditions, nearly twice as often as the average EU resident — though the rate is falling fast (by 12.5 pp in a decade). Poles earn ever better but still live cramped.

The contrast with motorisation is telling: Poland now has more cars per inhabitant than Germany (639 vs 593) — partly because of used-car imports and weak public transport outside the big cities. Cars yes, square metres no.

The greatest challenge of this portrait. Poland now has 40% fewer births than in 2017, and natural decrease — 45 per 10,000 inhabitants — is the highest since the Second World War outside the pandemic years. The scissors have been opening since 2018 and nothing suggests they will close.

The Statistics Poland simulation shows the price: at 2024 fertility the country would have 28.4 million inhabitants in 2060, a quarter fewer than today, and one in three would be over 65. It is an experimental exercise, not a forecast — but the direction is unambiguous.

The strongest proof that money does not buy births: the 500+ programme (800+ since 2024) cut child poverty sharply (chapter 5), but after a brief rebound in 2017 fertility fell to the lowest level ever recorded. Poland is now 0.2 below the EU average, which is itself falling.

The fertility decline is Europe-wide, but faster in Poland — the only indicator in this portrait where Poland has in recent years lost ground to the EU instead of gaining it.

The best-documented proof of reversed migration: a country that after 2004 was a symbol of emigration issued, for a decade, more first residence permits than Germany, France or Spain. The fall after 2021 reflects temporary protection for Ukrainians (a different procedure), not a drop in immigration.

Foreigners now make up about 8% of those insured with the social-insurance institution and about 6% of workers — and it is largely they who fill the gap opened by the scissors of the previous chart. Official population statistics do not yet see it.

A concrete, generational dark side of the wage boom: pensions are rising fast in nominal terms (+14% in 2024), but their ratio to wages has fallen by almost 8 points since 2015. Workers are getting richer faster than pensioners, and the share of very low benefits is growing.

Together with demography (the previous charts) this forms the most important long-term tension of this portrait: fewer and fewer workers, more and more beneficiaries, and a benefit-to-wage ratio that is already declining.

All of Poland is ageing (chapter 3), but not everywhere alike. The oldest are the Kielce region, Łódź, West Pomerania, Lublin and Opole — regions whose young people have been leaving for the metropolises for decades; the youngest — Warsaw with its ring, Lesser Poland, Pomerania and Greater Poland, i.e. the destinations of those moves. The 5-point difference in the share of seniors between the extreme regions is the distance the whole of Poland travelled in the last ten years.

For public policy this is a map of demand for care and geriatrics — and of the supply of working hands. The older regions are also poorer and less populated, which makes their problem a double one: fewer contributors, more beneficiaries.

Labour immigration, which in a decade turned Poland from a country of emigration into one of immigration (previous chart), is spread extremely unevenly: Mazovia, Lower Silesia, Greater Poland and Lubusz — the regions of metropolises, logistics and industry along the western border — employ foreigners four to seven times more often per inhabitant than Subcarpathia, the Kielce region or Warmia-Masuria. The map mirrors the unemployment map (chapter 5): where hands were short, workers from Ukraine, Belarus and increasingly from Asia arrived.

The numbers come with the two caveats under the map: the voivodeship is the company's seat, not the workplace, and the regional sum exceeds the national figure — so this is a map of intensity, not an exact census.